The aim of this paper is to generalize the oligopolistic market equilibrium problems when the data depend on time. We present results regarding the existence of solutions to such problems. Moreover, we show that continuity regularity results hold, and we use them in order to numerically solve the dynamic equilibrium problem.
It is worth mentioning that Dafermos and Nagurney (see [4] ) established the relationship between the spatial oligopoly model and the perfectly competitive spatial price equilibrium model.
The existence of a Nash-equilibrium was established in Nash's original paper under the assumptions that the sets X i are simplexes and the utility functions u i are bilinear functions of the strategies. Rosen (see [5] ) proved existence in the more general case where the common strategy set X is a nonempty, compact and convex subset of R n (not necessarily a product set) and the functions u i are concave on X; he also established the uniqueness and the stability of such an equilibrium when X is described by a set of inequalities and the utility functions are such that the operator −F α : X → R n , defined by:
. . , α n ∂u n ∂x n , is strictly monotone on X for given α i > 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Both results are obtained by application of Brouwer's Fixed Point
Theorem and depend crucially on the compactness and convexity of X.
Karamardian (see [6] ) relaxed the assumption of the compactness of X and provided a proof of existence and uniqueness of Nash-equilibrium when X is the nonnegative orthant R n + and the utility functions are such that the operator −F α : X → R n , defined by:
is continuous and strongly monotone on X (see also [7] ). Such a monotonicity condition is not necessary as we show below. Gabay and Moulin (see [8] ), assuming that a coercivity condition on the operator is fulfilled, guaranteed the existence of a Nash equilibrium even if the feasible set is no longer compact. Moreover, if the opposite of the gradient of the profit satisfies the strict monotonicity condition, as it is well known, the uniqueness of the equilibrium is guaranteed, provided that the solution exists.
In our work here, we introduce a time-dependent version of the oligopolistic market equilibrium. We then reformulate it with the help of parametric variational inequalities, in particular evolutionary variational inequalities (EVI), where the parameter is taken to represent physical time. For a further introduction to EVI, the reader is addressed to [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] , and to the relationship between the dynamic network equilibrium problems and EVI see [14] .
Via the VI reformulation we are able to show that time-dependent oligopolistic market equilibrium problems have solutions (i.e., time-dependent market equilibria exist), we are able to identify conditions under which these solutions are continuous with respect to time, and to derive a computational procedure to numerically approximate their solutions. The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we recall some fundamental concept about the infinite dimensional variational inequalities. In Section 3, we formulate the time-dependent oligopolistic market equilibrium (TOME) problem and we show that it can be equivalently formulated as a variational inequality problem. In Section 4 we show that TOME admits solutions and that these solutions could be continuous, assuming certain conditions are satisfied. Finally in Section 5 we present the computation of such a solution and an example.
Preliminary concepts
We recall some concepts related to the monotonicity. Let X be a real topological vector space and let S be a subset of X. Moreover let X * be the topological dual space of X.
Definiton 2.1. An operator F : S → X * is said to be
• strictly monotone on S if
• strongly monotone on S if for some ν > 0
• pseudomonotone on S (in the sense of Karamadian) if for all
• pseudomonotone on S (in the sense of Brezis) if
where x n 0 means that {x n } weakly converges to 0.
We recall some concepts about the hemicontinuity. Let X be a real topological vector space and let K be a convex subset of X. Definiton 2.2. An operator F : K → X * is said to be
• hemicontinuous if for any x ∈ K, the function
is upper semi-continuous on K;
• hemicontinuous along line segments if and only if for any x, y ∈ K, the function 
(1)
In the following, we give some existence results of solutions to infinite dimensional variational inequalities, in particular we recall two existence theorems that can be found in [15] [16] [17] , and which we will use in the following. 
(ii) F is hemicontinuous.
Then, there exists
It is important to remark that Ernst and Théra (see [18] ) proved that a linear variational inequality over a real Hilbert space admits solutions for every bounded closed and convex set if and only if the linear operator which defines the inequality is pseudo monotone in the sense of Brezis.
Dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium
Let us consider m firms P i , i = 1, 2, . . . , m, and n demand markets Q j , j = 1, 2, . . . , n, that are generally spatially separated.
Assume that the homogeneous commodity, produced by the m firms and consumed at the n markets, is involved during a
. . , m, denoted the nonnegative commodity output produced by firm P i at the time t ∈ [0, T] and let q j (t), t ∈ [0, T], j = 1, 2, . . . , n, denote the demand for the commodity at demand market Q j at the same time The following feasibility conditions hold for every i and j and a.e. in [0, T]:
Hence, the quantity produced by a firm, at the time t ∈ [0, T], must be equal to the sum of the commodity from that firm to all the demand markets, at the same t ∈ [0, T], and the demand at a demand market, at the time t ∈ [0, T], must be equal to the sum of all the commodity shipments to that demand market, at the same t ∈ [0, T]. Furthermore, assuming that the nonnegative commodity shipment between the supply market P i and the demand market Q j has to satisfy time-dependent constrains, namely that: 
This set is convex, closed and bounded in the Hilbert space L
. Furthermore, associate with each firm P i a production cost f i (t), t ∈ [0, T], i = 1, 2, . . . , m, but allow now for the more general situation where the production cost of a firm i may depend upon the entire production patter, namely,
Similarly, allow the demand price for the commodity at a demand market to depend, in general, upon the entire consumption pattern, namely,
Then, we have the following mappings:
. . , n, denote the transaction cost at the same time t ∈ [0, T], which includes between firm P i and demand market Q j . Here we permit the transaction cost to depend, in general, upon the entire shipment pattern, namely,
where we have denoted with p and d the vector-functions given by (2) and (3). Now consider the dynamic oligopolistic market mechanism, in which the m firms supply the commodity in a noncooperative fashion, each one trying to maximize its own profit at the time t ∈ [0, T]. We seek to determine a nonnegative commodity distribution pattern x for which the m firms will be in a state of equilibrium as defined below. 
where we denote by
In the Hilbert space L
is its duality mapping, where We recall at this point that a function v (as for example given by (9) ) is called pseudoconcave with respect to x i , i = 1, 2, . . . , m, (see [19] ) if the following holds a.e. in [0, T]:
We show next how an equilibrium problem defined by (10) can be reformulated as an evolutionary variational inequality. 
Proof. Let us show first that evolutionary variational inequality (12) is equivalent to
In fact, if (13) is not true, we have
we obtain
We thus obtained the equivalence between the evolutionary variational inequalities (12) and (13) . Now, we proceed to proving the theorem. Assume first that x * (t) is a solution of the game (10), but it is not a solution of the evolutionary variational inequality (12) . We showed that a necessary and sufficient condition to have (10) is to have:
Since ∇v i is a Carathèodory function, (11) holds and
which, by summing over all firms P i , yields (12) . Conversely, we assume that x * (t) is a solution of evolutionary variational inequality (12) but it is not a solution of the game (10). This implies
Since the profit v(t, x(t)) is a pseudoconcave function with respect to x i , it follows that
But choosing a vector x ∈ K, such that x i (t) = x * i (t), for i = i, and x i = x i , then
and so 
∇v(t, u(t)) ≤ h(t).

Then the evolutionary variational inequality (12) is equivalent to
This equivalence is very important in the construction of a discretization procedure to compute numerical solutions for dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problems.
Existence and regularity results
In this section a theorem for the existence of continuous solutions to the dynamic oligopolistic market problem is provided. Adapting classical existence Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 for infinite-dimensional variational inequalities and taking into account that our constraint set K is bounded, we derive the following theorem. 
2. −∇v is pseudomonotone and hemicontinuous along line segments; 3. −∇v is hemicontinuous on K with respect to the weak topology.
We want to establish next conditions under which our TOME problem has continuous solutions. To do so, we first need to recall the definition of set convergence given by Mosco (see [20] ). Definiton 4.1. Let (X, · ) be an Hilbert space and K a closed, nonempty, convex subset of X. A sequence of nonempty, closed, convex sets K n converges to K in Mosco's sense, as n → +∞, i.e. K n → K, if and only if (M1) for any x ∈ K, there exists a sequence {x n } n∈N strongly converging to x in X such that x n lies in K n for all n ∈ N, (M2) for any subsequence {x k n } n∈N weakly converging to x in X, such that x k n lies in K k n for all n ∈ N, then the weak limit x belongs to K.
As shown for the dynamic traffic equilibrium problem (see [21] ), here we prove that the feasible set of TOME problem satisfies the property of Mosco's convergence. 
as n → +∞, in Mosco's sense.
Proof. In order to prove that the sequence {K(t n )} n∈N converges to K(t) in Mosco's sense, for any sequence {t n } n∈N ⊆ [0, T] such that t n → t ∈ [0, T], as n → +∞, it is enough to show that conditions (M1) and (M2) hold.
For the first condition, let x(t) ∈ K(t) be fixed and let us consider the following sequence:
Let us verify that
Taking into account that
, the proof of the first condition (M1) has been obtained.
For the second one, let {x(t n )} n∈N be a fixed sequence, with x(t n ) ∈ K(t n ), ∀n ∈ N, such that x(t n )
x(t) (weakly) in R nm . Since the Euclidian spaces are three finite-dimensional spaces, then the weak convergence is equivalent to strongly. It remains to prove that x(t) ∈ K(t). From x(t n ) ∈ K(t n ), ∀n ∈ N, we derive
Passing to the limit for n → +∞ in (16) , and using the assumptions, we obtain
Then x(t) ∈ K(t), so the second condition (M2) has also been proved.
Hence, we conclude that 
is uniformly bounded for t ∈ [0, T].
Proof. Let us fix an arbitrary feasible vector
it follows
where C is a constant independent on t ∈ [0, T]. Then, the set (17) is uniformly bounded for t ∈ [0, T].
Now we can prove the continuity of the solution to the evolutionary variational inequality that models our dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem. (18), it follows that the operator −∇v is hemicontinuous along line segments. Moreover, the assumption of strictly pseudoconcaveness implies the strictly pseudomonotonicity of the operator −∇v (see [22] ). Then, the existence and the uniqueness to the solution to the dynamic Cournot-Nash equilibrium follow from the second part of Theorem 4.1.
Let us consider the solution x * (t) to variational inequality
and the solution x * (t n ) to the following variational inequality Taking into account of the closedness of K(t) we get that y(t) ∈ K(t). Now we prove that y(t) = x * (t).
Then, we consider the following variational inequality
, and letting ε → 0, it results The same result holds for each subsequence and therefore
namely our assert.
Computation of dynamic oligopolistic market equilibria
In this section, we introduce a method to solve the dynamic market equilibrium problem. In particular, we extend Marcotte's version [24] of the extragradient method to the calculus of the equilibrium solution for our problem (see also [25, 26] ).
We consider the evolutionary variational inequality
and we suppose that the assumptions above established are satisfied and hence the solution
We consider a partition of [0, T], such that
Then, for each value t k , for k = 0, . . . , N, we obtain a static variational inequality
where
and we apply an extragradient method to solve it. We can now compute the solution to the finite-dimensional variational inequality (30) using the following procedure. The algorithm, as it is well known, starting from any x Fig. 2 It can be verified that the operator satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 4.2, thus the dynamic oligopolistic market equilibrium problem has a unique continuous equilibrium solution. We compute an approximate solution to the problem using the generalization of Marcotte's method. This method is convergent for the property of the profit function v. Then, we can compute an approximate curve of equilibria, by selecting t i ∈ k
15
: k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 30} . We use a Matlab computation with an initial point x 0 (t i ) = (4t i , t i , 3t i , t i ). After the linear interpolation, we obtain the curves of equilibria shown in Fig. 2 .
